



Andrew Lewman
andrew@torproject.org



The Tor Project, Inc.

501(c)(3) non-profit organization
dedicated to the research and
development of technologies for
online anonymity and privacy

Topics

- ▶ Anonymous Communications
 - ▶ Tor Overview
 - ▶ The Future

What is Anonymity?



Anonymity isn't:

► Cryptography




```
010010000110010100100000011101000
110100001100001011101000010000001
110111011011110111010101101100011
001000010000001101101011000010110
101101100101010000110100001101
001011100110100000101111011101
110110111000010110001100110100
101100010011011001001110100
011110010011011011011001010
11000110111011001100110010100
101100001000001110101110101011
100110111010000100000011001110111
010101100001011100100110010000100
000011001010111011001100101011011
```

Anonymity isn't:

▸ Cryptography

▸ Stenography



255	005	111	156	230
128	055	191	047	201

Anonymity isn't:

- ▶ Cryptography
- ▶ Stenography
- ▶ **Wishful Thinking**



- ▶ “They can't prove it was me.”
- ▶ “Promise you won't tell.”
- ▶ “Well, I didn't sign it.”
- ▶ “The Internet is already anonymous, right?”

Examples of Wishful Thinking

- ▶ *“They can't prove it was me.”*
- ▶ “Promise you won't tell.”
- ▶ “Well, I didn't sign it.”
- ▶ “The Internet is already anonymous, right?”

- ▶ *“They can't prove it was me.”*
- ▶ “Promise you won't tell.”
- ▶ “Well, I didn't sign it.”
- ▶ “The Internet is already anonymous, right?”

Proof is a very strong word. Statistical analysis allows suspicion to become certainty.

- ▶ “They can't prove it was me.”
- ▶ *“Promise you won't tell.”*
- ▶ “Well, I didn't sign it.”
- ▶ “The Internet is already anonymous, right?”

- ▶ “They can't prove it was me.”
- ▶ *“Promise you won't tell.”*
- ▶ “Well, I didn't sign it.”
- ▶ “The Internet is already anonymous, right?”

Will other parties have the abilities and incentives to keep these promises?

- ▶ “They can't prove it was me.”
- ▶ “Promise you won't tell.”
- ▶ *“Well, I didn't sign it.”*
- ▶ “The Internet is already anonymous, right?”

- ▶ “They can't prove it was me.”
- ▶ “Promise you won't tell.”
- ▶ *“Well, I didn't sign it.”*
- ▶ “The Internet is already anonymous, right?”

Not what we're talking about.

- ▶ “They can't prove it was me.”
- ▶ “Promise you won't tell.”
- ▶ “Well, I didn't sign it.”
- ▶ *“The Internet is already anonymous, right?”*

- ▶ “They can't prove it was me.”
- ▶ “Promise you won't tell.”
- ▶ “Well, I didn't sign it.”
- ▶ *“The Internet is already anonymous, right?”*

Nope!

Anonymous Communication

People need to hide in a crowd of other people.

”Anonymity loves company.”

Anonymous Communication

The goal of the system is to make all users look as similar as possible.

Anonymous Communication

Hide who is
communicating
with whom.

Anonymous Communication

Layered encryption and random delays hide correlation between input traffic and output traffic.

*Anonymity serves different interests
for different user groups:*

Anonymity

Anonymity serves different interests for different user groups:

Private Citizens


"It's Privacy!"

Anonymity


Anonymity serves different interests for different user groups:



Anonymity serves different interests for different user groups:



Anonymity serves different interests for different user groups:



Tor is not the first system:
ZKS, mixmaster, single-hop
proxies, Crowds, Java Anon
Proxy, VPNs.

Low Latency Systems

Low-latency systems are vulnerable to end-to-end correlation attacks.

High Latency Systems

High-latency systems are more resistant to end-to-end correlation attacks, but by definition, are less interactive.

Low Latency Systems

- ▶ Low-latency systems are generally more attractive to today's user:

Interactive apps: web, instant messaging, VOIP, ssh, X11, cifs/nfs, video streaming (millions of users)

What is Tor?

- ▶ Online anonymity software and network

What is Tor?

Open source, freely
available, 3-clause
BSD licensed

What is Tor?

Active research environment:

*Rice, UMN, NSF, NRL, Drexel,
Waterloo, Cambridge UK, Bamberg
Germany, Boston Univ, Harvard,
MIT, RPI, Georgia Tech*

What is Tor?

Increasingly diverse toolset:

Tor, Torbutton, Tor Browser Bundle, TA(I)LS LiveCD, Tor Weather, Tor auto-responder, Secure Updater, Orbot, Torora, Tor Check, Arm, Nymble, Tor Control, Tor Wall, TorVM

Twitter In Iran: Good

Iran Protests: Twitter, the Medium of the Movement

By LEV GROSSMAN Wednesday, Jun. 17, 2009

Related

Photos



Behind the Scenes
with Mousavi

Stories

- In Iran, Rival Regime Factions Play a High-Stakes Game of Chicken
- Latest Tweets on Fallout from Iran's



Share The U.S. State Department doesn't usually take an interest in the maintenance schedules of dotcom start-ups. But over the weekend, officials there reached out to Twitter and asked them to delay a network upgrade that was scheduled for Monday night. The reason? To protect the interests of

From <http://www.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,1905125,00.html>

Twitter In USA: Bad

FBI Raids Queens Home in G20 Protest Twitter Crackdown



AP Photo/Matt Rourke

That's right, a Twitter crackdown. A lawyer for Jackson Heights social worker Elliot Madison, 41, says that the feds searched his client's house for 16 hours on Thursday after Madison was arrested on September 24th at a Pittsburgh hotel room with another man. What were they up to? Sitting at laptops sending Twitter messages advising [G20 demonstrators](#) about riot police activity in the streets. And yet *real* Twitter threats like [Lindsay Lohan](#) and [Courtney Love](#) remain at large.

Madison, a self-described anarchist, was in Pittsburgh volunteering for the [Tin Can Comms Collective](#), a group that uses Twitter to send mass text messages during protests describing events observed on the streets or over police scanners; stuff like "SWAT teams rolling down 5th Ave." Tin Can was active during the [St. Paul RNC protests](#), and the authorities are now on to them. Madison was charged with hindering apprehension or prosecution, criminal use of a communication facility and possession of instruments

of crime; he's currently out on bail.

Who Uses Tor?


- Law Enforcement
- Abuse Victims
- Human Rights Activists
- Militaries
- Business Executives
- Normal People




An aerial, high-angle photograph of a massive crowd of people filling a large stadium. The crowd is dense and colorful, with many people wearing white shirts. The stadium's seating tiers are visible, and the crowd extends to the very edges of the arena. In the lower-left corner, a banner with the text "HORMIPREN" is visible. The overall scene conveys a sense of a large-scale event or concert.

**Estimated 300k to 800k
daily users worldwide**


A Typical Internet Connection




Alice might be watched.




Parts of the network could be monitored.




Bob could be compromised.




How is Tor Different?




A Basic Relay System




An Evil Relay




An Evil Network




How Tor Works




Alice connects to an Entry Node.




The data is routed through a Middle Node.



The data is routed through an Exit Node.



Alice's circuit to Bob is established.



Vidalia Network Map

The screenshot shows the Vidalia Network Map application window titled "Tor Network Map". The interface includes a menu bar with "Refresh", "Zoom In", "Zoom Out", "Zoom To Fit", "Help", and "Close". A left sidebar lists various relays, each with a small icon and name. The main area displays a world map with yellow and green lines representing network connections between relays. A bottom panel shows a table of connections and their status, along with detailed information for the selected relay, exit3foertel.

Connection	Status
--voldo,kouvadaki,d0wnt1me	Open
--voldo,trusted,ArikaYumemiya	Open
--voldo,QuantumSevero,hasselb...	Open
--necrid,d0wnt1me,blutmagie	Open
--voldo,myraloy,MopperSmurf	Open
--necrid,wildnl,ZobrakDotNet	Open
--voldo,kyra,sandvine	Open
--voldo,worldstreif571,Quantum...	Open
--voldo,0000000000myTOR,Unna...	Open
--necrid,0x0080,exit3foertel,Pan...	Open

0x0080 (Online)
Location: Netherlands
IP Address: 62.212.66.193
Platform: Tor 0.2.1.26 on FreeBSD i386
Bandwidth: 2.33 MB/s
Uptime: 93 days 6 hours 25 mins 22 secs
Last Updated: 2010-12-10 17:04:35 GMT

exit3foertel (Online)
Location: United Kingdom

Metrics

- Measuring the Tor Network anonymously
- NSF grant for research
- Archive of hourly consensus, ExoneraTor, VisiTor
- Metrics portal:

<https://metrics.torproject.org>

Operating Systems leak info like a sieve...



Applications,
network stacks,
plugins, oh my...

Operating Systems leak info like a sieve...



Applications,
network stacks,
plugins, oh my...
...some
call this sharing.

Operating Systems leak info like a sieve...



Did you know
Microsoft Word
and OpenOffice
Writer are
browsers?

Operating Systems leak info like a sieve...



www.decloak.net

Discover how much
you like to share!

Mobile Operating Systems

- ▶ Entirely new set of challenges for something designed to know where you are at all times.
- ▶ Orbot: Tor on Android.
<https://guardianproject.info/apps/>
- ▶ Tor on iphone, maemo/meego, symbian, etc
- ▶ Tor on Windows CE. For example:
<http://www.gsmk.de>
- ▶ Guardian Project,
<https://guardianproject.info/>

Next steps:

Visit us at

<https://www.torproject.org/>
for more information, links, and ideas.

Credits and Thanks

- ▶ **Presentation:** Andrew Lewman, Executive Director for The Tor Project – andrew@torproject.org
- ▶ **Danger!**, <http://flickr.com/photos/hmvh/58185411/sizes/o/hmvh>, CC-BY-SA.
- ▶ **500k**,
<http://www.flickr.com/photos/lukaskracic/334850378/sizes/l/>
Luka Skracic, used with permission.
- ▶ **Illustration and Design:** J.M.Todaro – <http://jmtodaro.com>