\documentclass{beamer}
\mode<presentation>
\usetheme{Boadilla}
\title{DEA Tor Overview}
\author{Andrew Lewman \\ andrew@torproject.org}
\date{January 11, 2013}
\begin{document}

\begin{frame}
\maketitle  
\begin{center}
\includegraphics[height=3cm]{./images/2009-tor-logo}
\end{center}
\end{frame}

\begin{frame}
\frametitle{What are we talking about?}
\begin{itemize}
\item Crash course on anonymous communications
\item Quick overview of Tor
\item Quick overview of Tor Hidden Services
\item Future directions
\end{itemize}
\end{frame}

\begin{frame}
\frametitle{The Tor Project, Inc.}
501(c)(3) non-profit organization dedicated to the research and development of technologies for online anonymity and privacy
\begin{center}
\includegraphics[height=5cm]{./images/2009-oval_sticker_new}
\end{center}
\end{frame}

\begin{frame}
\frametitle{What is anonymity?}
\includegraphics[width=10cm]{./images/2llg3ts}
\end{frame}

\begin{frame}
\frametitle{Anonymity isn't cryptography}
\begin{itemize}
\item Cryptography protects the contents in transit
\item You still know who is talking to whom, how often, and how much data is sent.
\end{itemize}
\begin{center}
\includegraphics[width=5cm]{./images/encryption-cc-by-sa}
\end{center}
\end{frame}

\begin{frame}
\frametitle{Anonymity isn't steganography}
Attacker can tell Alice is talking to someone, how often, and how much data is sent.
\bigskip

\begin{center}
\includegraphics[width=5cm]{./images/steganography-cc-by-sa}
\end{center}
\end{frame}

\begin{frame}
\frametitle{Anonymity isn't just wishful thinking...}
\begin{itemize}
\item "You can't prove it was me!"
\pause \item "Promise you won't look"
\pause \item "Promise you won't remember"
\pause \item "Promise you won't tell"
\pause \item "I didn't write my name on it!"
\pause \item "Isn't the Internet already anonymous?"
\end{itemize}
\end{frame}

\begin{frame}
\frametitle{..since "weak" isn't anonymity.}
\begin{itemize}
\item \textit{"You can't prove it was me!"}  Proof is a very \textbf{strong} word.  Statistical analysis allows suspicion to become certainty.
\pause \item \textit{"Promise you won't look/remember/tell"}  Will other parties have the abilities and incentives to keep these promises?
\pause \item \textit{"I didn't write my name on it!"}  Not what we're talking about.
\pause \item \textit{"Isn't the Internet already anonymous?"}  Nope!
\end{itemize}
\end{frame}

\begin{frame}
\frametitle{Anonymous communication}
\begin{itemize}
\item People have to hide in a crowd of other people ("anonymity loves company")
\item The goal of the system is to make all users look as similar as possible, to give a bigger crowd
\item Hide who is communicating with whom
\item Layered encryption and random delays hide correlation between input traffic and output traffic
\end{itemize}
\end{frame}

\begin{frame}
\frametitle{Low versus High-latency anonymous communication systems}
\begin{itemize}
\item Tor is not the first system; ZKS, mixmaster, single-hop proxies, Crowds, Java Anon Proxy.
\item Low-latency systems are vulnerable to end-to-end correlation attacks.
\item High-latency systems are more resistant to end-to-end correlation attacks, but by definition, less interactive.
\end{itemize}
\end{frame}

\begin{frame}
\frametitle{Low-latency systems are generally more attractive to today's user}
\begin{itemize}
\item Interactive apps: web, instant messaging, VOIP, ssh, X11, cifs/nfs, video streaming (millions of users)
\item Multi-hour delays: email, nntp, blog posting? (tens of thousands of users?)
\pause \item \begin{center}\begin{Large}And if anonymity loves company...\end{Large}\end{center}
\end{itemize}
\end{frame}

\begin{frame}
\frametitle{What is Tor?}
\begin{itemize}
\item online anonymity software and network
\pause \item open source, freely available (3-clause BSD license)
\pause \item active research environment: \\
Drexel, Univ of Waterloo, Georgia Tech, Princeton, Boston University, University College London, Univ of Minnesota, National Science Foundation, Naval Research Labs, Cambridge UK, Bamberg Germany, MIT...
\pause \item increasingly diverse toolset: \\
Tor, Tor Browser Bundle, Tails LiveCD, Tor Weather, Tor auto-responder, Secure Updater, Orbot, Torora, Tor Check, Arm, Nymble, Tor Control, and so on.
\end{itemize}
\end{frame}

\begin{frame}
\frametitle{Other Systems}
\begin{itemize}
\item VPN - Virtual Private Network, 1 to 1 connection, can redirect all traffic, generally encrypted
\pause \item Proxy - 1 to 1 connection, per application traffic redirection, sometimes encrypted
\pause \item I2P - Garlic routing, closed network, anonymity and reputation
\pause \item Freenet - closed network, anonymity, distributed file storage and sharing
\pause \item GNUnet - closed network, anonymity, distributed file storage and sharing
\end{itemize}
\end{frame}

\begin{frame}
\frametitle{How is Tor different from other systems?}
\begin{overlayarea}{9cm}{6cm}
\only<1>{\includegraphics[height=7cm]{./images/single_hop_relay}}
\only<2>{\includegraphics[height=7cm]{./images/evil_single_hop_relay}}
\only<3>{\includegraphics[height=7cm]{./images/data_snooping_single_hop_relay}}
\end{overlayarea}
\end{frame}

\begin{frame}
\frametitle{Who uses Tor?}
\parbox{8cm}{\sloppy \setbeamercolor{background}[\includegraphics[scale=0.35]{./images/anonymousman}}
\parbox{3cm}{\sloppy 
\begin{flushleft}
\begin{itemize}
\begin{small}
\item Normal people
\item Law Enforcement
\item Human Rights Activists
\item Business Execs
\item Militaries
\item Abuse Victims
\end{small}
\end{itemize}
\end{flushleft}
}
\end{frame}

\begin{frame}
\frametitle{Who uses Tor?}
\begin{itemize}
\item <1> \textit{Normal users} \\ linking sensitive information to their current identities, online advertising networks, search engines, censorship circumvention
\item <2> \textit{Law enforcement}\\ accidental disclosure to targets, family and friend concerns, separating work from home life
\item <3> \textit{Rights Activists}\\ Personal safety, family safety, narrowly-defined publicity, censorship circumvention
\item <4> \textit{Business Execs}\\ separating work from home life, competitor research, censorship circumvention
\item <5> \textit{Abuse Victims and Survivors}\\ complete separation of past abuse and current life, finding help and safety, need to help others anonymously
\item <6> \textit{Militaries}\\ intelligence gathering, separating work from home life, other activities
\end{itemize}
\end{frame}

\begin{frame}
\frametitle{Doesn't Tor enable criminals to do bad things?}
\begin{quotation}
\noindent \includegraphics[width=1cm]{./images/opquo}\quad Criminals can already do bad things. Since they're willing to break laws, they already have lots of options available that provide better privacy than Tor provides. 
\end{quotation}
\flushright 
\small source: https://www.torproject.org/docs/faq-abuse.html.en\#WhatAboutCriminals
\end{frame}

\begin{frame}
\frametitle{estimated 500k to 900k daily users}
\includegraphics[scale=0.4]{./images/huge-crowd}
\end{frame}

\begin{frame}
\frametitle{Tor hides communication patterns by relaying data through volunteer servers}
\begin{center}
\begin{overlayarea}{9cm}{6cm}
\only<1>{\includegraphics[width=9cm]{./images/tor-network}}
\only<2>{\includegraphics[width=9cm]{./images/tor-safe-selection}}
\only<3>{\includegraphics[width=9cm]{./images/tor-safe-path}}
\only<4>{\includegraphics[width=9cm]{./images/tor-keys1}}
\end{overlayarea}
\flushright
\tiny Diagram: Robert Watson
\end{center}
\end{frame}

\begin{frame}
\frametitle{Vidalia Network Map}
\includegraphics[scale=0.4]{./images/vidalia-network-map}
\end{frame}

\begin{frame}
\frametitle{Metrics}
\begin{itemize}
\item Measuring metrics anonymously
\item NSF grant to find out
\item Archive of hourly consensus, ExoneraTor, VisiTor
\item Metrics portal: \\ \url{https://metrics.torproject.org/}
\end{itemize}
\end{frame}

\begin{frame}
\frametitle{Tor hidden services allow privacy enhanced hosting of services}
\includegraphics[scale=0.5]{./images/hidden-federalist}
\end{frame}

\begin{frame}
\frametitle{dot onion you say?}
\includegraphics[scale=0.6]{./images/hidden-federalist-zoom}
\end{frame}

\begin{frame}
\frametitle{Hidden Services, in graphics}
\begin{overlayarea}{9cm}{6cm}
\only<1>{\includegraphics[scale=0.5]{../../website/trunk/images/THS-1}}
\only<2>{\includegraphics[scale=0.5]{../../website/trunk/images/THS-2}}
\only<3>{\includegraphics[scale=0.5]{../../website/trunk/images/THS-3}}
\only<4>{\includegraphics[scale=0.5]{../../website/trunk/images/THS-4}}
\only<5>{\includegraphics[scale=0.5]{../../website/trunk/images/THS-5}}
\only<6>{\includegraphics[scale=0.5]{../../website/trunk/images/THS-6}}
\end{overlayarea}
\end{frame}

\begin{frame}
\frametitle{Operating Systems leak info like a sieve}
\parbox{5cm}{\sloppy \setbeamercolor{background}[\includegraphics[height=7cm]{./images/cropped-hijack-sign-south-africa}}
\parbox{5cm}{\begin{itemize}
\item Applications, network stacks, plugins, oh my....
\pause some call this "sharing"
\pause \item Did you know Microsoft Word and OpenOffice Writer are browsers?
\pause \item \url{www.decloak.net} is a fine test
\end{itemize}
}
\end{frame}

\begin{frame}
\frametitle{Mobile Operating Systems}
\begin{itemize}
\item Entirely new set of challenges for something designed to know where you are at all times.
\item Orbot:  Tor on Android.  \url{https://guardianproject.info/apps/}
\item Tor on iphone, maemo/meego, symbian, etc
\item Tor on Windows Mobile, \url{http://www.gsmk.de} as an example.
\item Guardian Project, \url{https://guardianproject.info/}
\end{itemize}
\end{frame}

\begin{frame}
\frametitle{Thanks!}
\includegraphics[scale=0.6]{./images/thankyou_img}
\flushright
Visit \url{https://www.torproject.org/} for more information, links, and ideas.
\end{frame}

\begin{frame}
\frametitle{Credits \& Thanks}
\begin{itemize}
\item who uses tor? \url{http://www.flickr.com/photos/mattw/2336507468/siz}, Matt Westervelt, CC-­BY-­SA.
\item danger!, \url{http://flickr.com/photos/hmvh/58185411/sizes/o/}, hmvh, CC-­BY-­SA.
\item 500k, \url{http://www.flickr.com/photos/lukaskracic/334850378/sizes/l/}, Luka Skracic, used with permission.
\item zscaler research, http://research.zscaler.com/2011/12/web-threats-trends-and-statistics.html
\end{itemize}
\end{frame}

\end{document}
