\documentclass{beamer}
\mode<presentation>
\usetheme{Pittsburgh}
\usecolortheme{beaver}
\title{Online Anonymity}
\author{Andrew Lewman \\ andrew@torproject.org}
\date{\today}
\begin{document}

\begin{frame}
\maketitle  
\begin{center}
\includegraphics[height=3cm]{./images/2009-tor-logo}
\end{center}
\end{frame}
  
\begin{frame}
\frametitle{What is anonymity?}
\includegraphics[width=10cm]{./images/2llg3ts}
\end{frame}

\begin{frame}
\frametitle{Anonymity isn't cryptography}
\begin{itemize}
\item Cryptography protects the contents in transit
\item You still know who is talking to whom, how often, and how much data is sent.
\end{itemize}
\begin{center}
\includegraphics[width=5cm]{./images/encryption-cc-by-sa}
\end{center}
\end{frame}

\begin{frame}
\frametitle{Anonymity isn't steganography}
Attacker can tell Alice is talking to someone, how often, and how much data is sent.
\bigskip

\begin{center}
\includegraphics[width=5cm]{./images/steganography-cc-by-sa}
\end{center}
\end{frame}

\begin{frame}
\frametitle{Anonymity isn't just wishful thinking...}
\begin{itemize}
\item "You can't prove it was me!"
\pause \item "Promise you won't look"
\pause \item "Promise you won't remember"
\pause \item "Promise you won't tell"
\pause \item "I didn't write my name on it!"
\pause \item "Isn't the Internet already anonymous?"
\end{itemize}
\end{frame}

\begin{frame}
\frametitle{..since "weak" isn't anonymity.}
\begin{itemize}
\item \textit{"You can't prove it was me!"}  Proof is a very \textbf{strong} word.  Statistical analysis allows suspicion to become certainty.
\pause \item \textit{"Promise you won't look/remember/tell"}  Will other parties have the abilities and incentives to keep these promises?
\pause \item \textit{"I didn't write my name on it!"}  Not what we're talking about.
\pause \item \textit{"Isn't the Internet already anonymous?"}  Nope!
\end{itemize}
\end{frame}

\begin{frame}
\frametitle{Anonymous communication}
\begin{itemize}
\item People have to hide in a crowd of other people ("anonymity loves company")
\item The goal of the system is to make all users look as similar as possible, to give a bigger crowd
\item Hide who is communicating with whom
\item Layered encryption and random delays hide correlation between input traffic and output traffic
\end{itemize}
\end{frame}

\begin{frame}
\frametitle{Low versus High-latency anonymous communication systems}
\begin{itemize}
\item Tor is not the first system; ZKS, mixmaster, single-hop proxies, Crowds, Java Anon Proxy.
\item Low-latency systems are vulnerable to end-to-end correlation attacks.
\item High-latency systems are more resistant to end-to-end correlation attacks, but by definition, less interactive.
\end{itemize}
\end{frame}

\begin{frame}
\frametitle{Low-latency systems are generally more attractive to today's user}
\begin{itemize}
\item Interactive apps: web, instant messaging, VOIP, ssh, X11, cifs/nfs, video streaming (millions of users)
\item Multi-hour delays: email, nntp, blog posting? (tens of thousands of users?)
\pause \item \begin{center}\begin{Large}And if anonymity loves company...\end{Large}\end{center}
\end{itemize}
\end{frame}

\begin{frame}
\frametitle{Who wants anonymity online?}
\parbox{7cm}{\sloppy \setbeamercolor{background}[\includegraphics[scale=0.35]{./images/anonymousman}}
\parbox{3cm}{\sloppy 
\begin{itemize}
\begin{small}
\item Normal people
\item Law Enforcement
\item Human Rights Activists
\item Business Execs
\item Militaries
\item Abuse Victims
\end{small}
\end{itemize}
}
\end{frame}

\begin{frame}
\frametitle{What is Tor?}
\begin{itemize}
\item online anonymity, circumvention software and network
\item open source, free software (BSD 3-clause \& GPLv2 licenses)
\pause \item active research environment: \\
Rice, UMN, NSF, NRL, Drexel, Waterloo, Cambridge UK, Bamberg Germany, Boston U, Harvard, MIT, RPI, GaTech
\pause \item increasingly diverse toolset: \\
Tor, Torbutton, Tor Browser Bundle, TorVM, Incognito LiveCD, Tor Weather, Tor auto-responder, Secure Updater, Orbot, TorFox, Torora, Portable Tor, Tor Check, Arm, Nymble, Tor Control, Tor Wall
\end{itemize}
\end{frame}

\begin{frame}
\frametitle{Who is The Tor Project, Inc?}
\begin{columns}[c]
\column{5cm}
\includegraphics[height=4.5cm]{./images/2009-oval_sticker_new}
\column{5cm}
The 501(c)(3) non-profit organization dedicated to the research and development of tools for online anonymity and privacy
\end{columns}
\end{frame}

\begin{frame}
\frametitle{Tor is a low-latency anonymity system}
\begin{itemize}
\item<1-> Based on technology developed in the Onion Routing project
\item<2-> Privacy by design, not by policy (no data collected)
\item<3-> Commonly used for web browsing and instant messaging (works for any TCP traffic)
\item<4-> Originally built as a pure anonymity system (hides who is talking to whom)
\item<5-> Now designed to resist censorship too (hides whether someone is using the system at all)
\end{itemize}

\begin{center}
\includegraphics[height=3cm]{./images/2009-tor-logo}
\end{center}
\end{frame}

\begin{frame}
\frametitle{Tor code stats}
\includegraphics[width=10.5cm]{./images/ohloh-lines-of-code-by-language}
\flushright \tiny stats from http://www.ohloh.net/p/tor
\end{frame}

\begin{frame}
\frametitle{How many people use Tor?}
No idea. It's an anonymity system. \\[1cm]
\pause http://metrics.torproject.org/ for an idea.
\end{frame}

\begin{frame}
\frametitle{estimated 500,000 daily users}
\setbeamercolor{background}[\includegraphics[scale=0.4]{./images/huge-crowd}]
\end{frame}

\begin{frame}
\frametitle{No really, how many people use Tor?}
\begin{flushleft}
\includegraphics[width=12cm]{./images/2009-12-16-mozilla-stats}
\end{flushleft}
\end{frame}


\begin{frame}
  \frametitle{Tor hides communication patterns by relaying data through volunteer servers}
  \begin{center}
    \begin{overlayarea}{9cm}{6cm}
    \only<1>{\includegraphics[width=9cm]{./images/tor-network}}
    \only<2>{\includegraphics[width=9cm]{./images/tor-safe-selection}}
    \only<3>{\includegraphics[width=9cm]{./images/tor-safe-path}}
    \end{overlayarea}
    \flushright
    \tiny Diagram: Robert Watson
  \end{center}
\end{frame}

\begin{frame}
\frametitle{Tor hidden services allow censorship resistant services}
\includegraphics[scale=0.5]{./images/wikileaks}
\end{frame}
  
\begin{frame}
\frametitle{How is Tor different from other systems?}
\\[1cm]
\begin{center}
\only<1>{\includegraphics[height=7cm]{./images/single_hop_relay}}
\only<2>{\includegraphics[height=7cm]{./images/evil_single_hop_relay}}
\only<3>{\includegraphics[height=7cm]{./images/data_snooping_single_hop_relay}}
\end{center}
\end{frame}
  
\begin{frame}
\frametitle{How to get involved}
\begin{center}
\begin{huge}https://torproject.org/volunteer\end{huge}
\end{center}
\end{frame}

\begin{frame}
\frametitle{Limitations of anonymous communication}
\begin{itemize}
\item There is something for everyone to like, and something for everyone to dislike, going on with online anonymity systems
\item Bad people do use them to do bad things (for many different definitions of bad people)
\item It is impossible to block bad uses, even if we could come up with a common definition of bad content
\item The systems are not perfect, so it is possible some people will be caught
\end{itemize}
\end{frame}

\begin{frame}
\frametitle{Freedom of speech and anonymity}

\textbf{United States Constitution: 1st Amendment}

\begin{quotation}
\noindent \includegraphics[width=1cm]{./images/opquo}\quad Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances.
\end{quotation}

\textbf{McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Commission}

\begin{quotation}
\noindent \includegraphics[width=1cm]{./images/opquo}\quad Protections for anonymous speech are vital to democratic discourse. Allowing dissenters to shield their identities frees them to express critical, minority views \ldots Anonymity is a shield from the tyranny of the majority \ldots It thus exemplifies the purpose behind the Bill of Rights, and of the First Amendment in particular
\end{quotation}
\end{frame}

\begin{frame}
\frametitle{Twitter in Iran: Good.}
\includegraphics[scale=0.5]{./images/twitter-iran-protests-time}
\flushright{\tiny From http://www.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,1905125,00.html}
\end{frame}

\begin{frame}
\frametitle{Twitter in USA: Bad.}
\includegraphics[scale=0.45]{./images/twitter-g20-pittsburgh-gothamist}
\flushright{\tiny from http://gothamist.com/2009/10/05/fbi\_raids\_queens\_home\_in\_g20\_protes.php}
\end{frame}

\begin{frame}
\frametitle{Internet architecture allows surveillance}
\includegraphics[width=10cm]{./images/cnmap}
\flushright
\tiny Diagram: China Internet Network Information Center
\end{frame}

\begin{frame}
\frametitle{Internet surveillance is pervasive}
     \begin{columns}[t]
      \column{7cm}
\begin{itemize}
\item Conventional surveillance methods had to be targeted
\item Internet censorship is capable of monitoring everyone, all of the time
\item Governments are increasing monitoring: SORM (Russia), Golden Shield (China), Data Retention Directive (EU), and Interception Modernisation Programme (UK), Warrantless Wiretapping (USA)
\item 1 in 7 East German citizens worked for the Stasi. Today we can achieve the same results for a fraction of the cost.
\end{itemize}
     \column{5cm}
     \vbox{}
    \parbox{5cm}{\includegraphics[width=4.5cm]{./images/nsa-room}}
    \end{columns}
\end{frame}

\begin{frame}
\frametitle{Traffic data surveillance}
\begin{itemize}
\item Traffic data (who talks to whom, how often and for how long) is the core of intelligence capabilities
\item This information is cheaper to record and store, compared to full content
\item Because it can be easily processed by computer, data mining techniques can be used to understand social structures
\end{itemize}

\begin{quotation}
\noindent \includegraphics[width=1cm]{./images/opquo}\quad No government of any colour is to be trusted with such a roadmap to our souls
\end{quotation}
\flushright --- Sir Ken Macdonald, former director of public prosecutions, on the UK Interception Modernisation Program
\end{frame}

\begin{frame}
    \frametitle{Importantly, information on social networks can be derived}
    \begin{columns}[t]
      \column{4.5cm}
      \vspace{0cm}
      
             {\color{red}$\bullet$} Communities\newline
             {\color{blue}$\bullet$} People
             \column{7cm}
             \vbox{}
             
             \includegraphics[clip, trim=5cm 12cm 2cm 5cm,width=7cm]{./images/network}
    \end{columns}
    \flushright{\tiny From "The Economics of Mass Surveillance" by George Danezis and Bettina Wittneben}
  \end{frame}
 
\begin{frame}
\frametitle{The Transparent Society}

   \begin{columns}[t]
   \column{7cm}
\begin{itemize}
\item David Brin proposed that in a world of pervasive surveillance, balance could be maintained by allowing everyone to monitor everyone else
\item Bruce Schneier retorted that surveillance amplifies existing powers
\item Many countries restrict anonymous speech (e.g.\ Germany and China)
\item It is easy for those in power to call on the weak to link their names to opinions
\end{itemize}

      \column{5cm}
     \vbox{}
    \parbox{5cm}{\includegraphics[width=4.5cm]{./images/namesheet}}

\flushright{\tiny Photo: Manos Simonides}
    \end{columns}
\end{frame}

\begin{frame}
\frametitle{One Version of the Future}
\begin{quotation}
\noindent \includegraphics[width=1cm]{./images/opquo}\quad 
I'd like to change the design of the Internet by introducing regulation--Internet passports, Internet police and international agreement--about following Internet standards. And if some countries don't agree with or don't pay attention to the agreement, just cut them off.
\end{quotation}
\flushright --- Eugene Kaspersky, Co-Founder \& CEO of Kaspersky Labs
\end{frame}

\begin{frame}
\frametitle{Another version of the future}
\begin{quotation}
\noindent \includegraphics[width=1cm]{./images/opquo}\quad
Universal identification is impossible. Even attribution -- knowing who is responsible for particular Internet packets -- is impossible. Attempting to build such a system is futile, and will only give criminals and hackers new ways to hide.
\end{quotation}
\flushright --- Bruce Schneier, Security Technologist \& Chief Security Technology Officer of BT
\flushright{\tiny from http://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2010/02/anonymity_and_t_3.html}
\end{frame}

\begin{frame}
\frametitle{Conclusions}
\begin{itemize}
\item The Internet and centralisation can both improve and harm freedom of speech
\item Slogans regarding the borderless nature and inherent freedoms of the Internet are frequently wrong
\item Technical details matter: how a system is implemented can make a radical difference
\item Technologies are tools, they can be used for good and bad
\item However, policies must be changed too and pressure is needed on legislators
\end{itemize}
\end{frame}

\begin{frame}
\frametitle{Credits}
\begin{itemize}
\item Thank you to Steven J. Murdoch, \url{http://www.cl.cam.ac.uk/users/sjm217/}, for the research and basis for this presentation.
\item who uses tor? \url{http://www.flickr.com/photos/mattw/2336507468/siz}, Matt Westervelt, CC-­BY-­SA.
\item 500k, \url{http://www.flickr.com/photos/lukaskracic/334850378/sizes/l/}, Luka Skracic, used with permission.
\item Photographer and Diagram credits as listed throughout the presentation.
\end{itemize}
\end{frame}

\end{document}
